We make several extensions to the recent literature on job loss while modernizing the very early j ob-displacement literature. After constructing a dynamic model of two-sided learning between a firm and its workers, we estimate it using personnel data from Fokker Aircraft that cover the path of layoffs and quits through its bankruptcy in March 1996. We find that the firm learns about workers' loyalty (demonstrating the role of information in repeated cooperative principal-agent relationships), while workers do not learn (consistent with earlier empirical results on American workers). The type of data that we use also generates information on the value of learning and on whether and how the characteristics of workers who remain until the firm's death differ from those of all affected workers. It thus allows us to measure the increases in the firm's value from learning about its workers' behavior and to infer the extent of biases in estimating losses from displacement from samples restricted to displaced workers.
Introduction
The modern literature on worker displacement (surveyed by Fallick 1996 , and recently extended to Europe by Burda/Mertens 2001) is based almost exclusively on household data describing the pre-and post-displacement experiences of workers or, in a few cases (e.g., Jacobson et al. 1993 ) on establishment information that generates similar data. This information is ideal for measuring the losses of those workers who actually wind up being displaced. So long as workers anticipate a shutdown or firms layoff workers non-randomly before the shutdown, however, the potential non-randomness of these sources of self-selection of workers from a declining firm means that these data do not allow us to measure the average loss that the shutdown generates.
A plant shutdown is not an experiment whose impact we can infer by comparing displaced to other workers. As in many other examples where selection on one or both sides of the market comes into play (Heckman et al. 1998) , we need information on workers' mobility over the firm's pre-shutdown history to evaluate whether the losses estimated for workers who are actually displaced provide an unbiased estimate of the losses of all workers affected by the eventual closing.
The process of worker-firm interactions that lead up to a plant closing is missed by a literature that concentrates on comparisons of displaced workers' pre-and post-displacement earnings. If the agents are rational, that process must involve attempts by both sides to gather information about each other's expectations and intentions, information that is partly revealed by the firm's recent turnover history. 1 Moreover, the typical firm is not accustomed to decline and needs information to design an optimal policy to adjust downwards. This information may be collected optimally during a sequence of downsizing operations.
Even in times of low unemployment plant closings account for a substantial fraction of job losses (Dunne et al. 1989 , Farber 1997 ; and while displaced workers can obtain jobs at such times, many will lose some or all of the firm-specific human capital and other quasi-rents that they had obtained in their previous employment (Kletzer 1989) . The problem of worker displacement -the magnitude of displaced workers' losses, and the process by which investment in human capital adjusts as a firm declines toward shutdown -should be of interest regardless of the overall state of the labor market.
The annual labor cost attributable to workers involved in plant closings is large. For example, in 2006 we estimate this to be nearly $ 10 billion in U.S. manufacturing alone. 2 In order to understand the size of the annual savings to employers resulting from their learning during mass layoffs that lead up to the closings, we need to know the length of time between preliminary layoffs and plant closing, what fraction of workers involved in the closing previously experienced a mass layoff, and how much firms' learning allows them to save on the costs of those workers who are retained. Interestingly, economists' focus on displacement in the 1950s and early 1960s was as much on the process of displacement as on workers' post-displacement adjustment. Those studies (e.g., Shultz/Weber 1966) had the data required to analyze information exchanges along the path to displacement, but the necessary theoretical and econometric tools were lacking.
In this study we try to remedy what we believe are holes in recent research on mobility while updating/modernizing the early displacement literature. We have data describing workers at each episode along the road to the eventual demise of a large Dutch corporation. These data allow us to examine the various modes of turnover before the firm's death and to use them to infer how workers and the firm learn about the firm's prospects and the workers' intentions. The data enable us to study whether and how the characteristics of workers who remain until the firm's death differ from those of all of its affected workers and thus to infer the extent of biases in measuring the losses arising from displacement when the sample is restricted to workers who are actually displaced. The richness of the data set and the questions it allows us to examine more than offset any 1 Hamermesh (1987) used household data on the time path of wage-tenure relationships to infer learning on the workers' side of this information exchange. While useful, such data cannot provide a picture of the extent and types of labor turnover generated as a firm heads toward oblivion. 2 Assume, following Farber's 1997: Table A-6 calculations, that the fraction 0.015 of manufacturing employees lost their jobs in 2006 due to plant closings. Average annual earnings in manufacturing are $ 16.73*41.1*52, and there are 14.215 million manufacturing employees. Assume also that non-wage costs are 20 percent of wages. Then the annual labor cost attributable to workers involved in plant closings in manufacturing is $ 9.1 billion. Since Farber includes only workers with at least three years of tenure with the firm, his numbers, and thus our estimates, are probably lower bounds.
potential biases that might result if the firm is unrepresentative of large firms that disappear.
In the next section we present a stylized model of learning by workers and firms that stresses the exchange of information between the two parties. In Section 3 we describe our data and provide summary statistics charting the firm's demise, while in Section 4 we estimate an empirical version of the model presented in Section 2. Section 5 uses data on the entire pre-displacement history of the firm in order to infer the selectivity-adjusted losses generated by worker displacement, while Section 6 illustrates the monetary gains a firm would make if it accounted for learning in structuring its layoff policies.
A model of two-sided learning
Downsizing not only dislocates workers. It also changes the prospects of the workers who remain with the firm. A firm hit by a sequence of negative shocks that result in workforce adjustments can learn about how the quit behavior of its workers is affected by the adjustments and can update its firing policy accordingly. Workers who remain also have the opportunity to learn about the firm's preferences and can likewise update the information that enters their decision about quitting. We develop a two-sided learning model of the firm that accounts for these changes during downsizing episodes. Adjustment of earnings during displacement is a commonly addressed issue (see, e.g., Carneiro/ Portugal 2006); learning about workers' abilities in the context of analyzing wage dynamics has been studied before (Farber/Gibbons 1996 , Felli/Harris 1996 , Altonji/Pierret 2001 , as has learning in the context of shocks to production (Francois/Roberts 2003) ; but the general issue of two-sided learning in the context of employment decisions has not heretofore been analyzed in a way amenable to empirical analysis.
We assume that the firm faces fixed costs of firing. When shocks arrive the firm must decide whether to downsize or not, and if it downsizes it does so by lumpy adjustments (Hamermesh 1989 , Pfann/Verspagen 1989 . Under a fixed-cost regime there is an option value for the firm of waiting to adjust, and during that period some workers decide to leave (Pfann 2006) . Announcements of corporate restructuring change the values of contracts between the workers and the firm, and wage adjustments may be needed to continue some of the relationships, or unintended separations may follow (see also McLaughlin 1991 , Pfann 2001 . We specify the following sequence of responses. An announcement from the firm's management arrives at the beginning of the first period when the employer and the employees are unacquainted with the each other's response behavior. The announcement is considered as an unanticipated shock by the employees. Some workers will respond to that shock without having observed the firm's management's actual realization of the announced action. Upon these actions the employer forms beliefs about the intended behavior of all workers, infers from that how other -incumbentworkers comparable to those acting could have responded but did not, and determines who should be fired and who should not. Waiting and collecting this extra information is an optimal strategy for an agent that faces irreversible costs of adjustment.
The initial episode of decline
If the firm is hit by an unexpected shock in product demand that makes a downward adjustment of its workforce imperative, neither it nor its workers knows about the outcomes of each other's strategic choices in response to that shock. In accordance with the observed response behavior (cf. Pfann 2001: Figure 1 ), we assume that workers act first and that the firm waits to adjust until after it has observed its workers' responses.
Worker-initiated separations during the initial episode
The firm employs N\ tenured workers. First we consider optimization by worker i, i = 1,..., Ni. She makes a decision whether or not to stay in the firm and continue making firm-specific investments based on a comparison of the expected streams of future earnings inside and outside the firm. Her decision under uncertainty is written as Qa = Q*(X,i;e,i), «=l,...,Ari
where q]j is the unobserved quit propensity of worker i during Episode 1, is a vector of individual characteristics explaining Q*j, and e,i is a worker-specific normally distributed error with zero mean and variance cp) 2 . Although Q'j is unobserved, other workers' behavior reveals to the firm which workers are likely to quit. Denote Q,i = 1 if Qm > 0 for the Np worker-initiated separations, and Q,i = 0 if Q*j < 0 for the Nf =N\ -Np workers who stay until the end of the first episode. The probability of observing that worker i quits is
where /?x is a vector of unknown parameters. A trade union might provide information to the worker about the employer's possible reneging on what workers believe to be an implicit contract (Hogan 2001 ), but we ignore that intermediation here. For our purposes, it does not matter if the worker's behavior is mediated by a trade union.
Employer-initiated separations at the end of the initial episode
The optimizing firm decides whom to layoff by comparing the expected stream of a worker's future wages to his future productivity. The unobserved propensity to fire worker i in Episode 1, F*¡, is written under uncertainty as = F*(Zil;v,1),
where Z,i is a vector of the individual worker's characteristics explaining , and u,\ is a worker-specific normally distributed productivity shock with zero mean and variance Firing decisions are related to the worker's age. In general, after an initial period of increase, a worker's productivity declines with age. To avoid shirking the firm will fire the most experienced workers with the lowest output (Stiglitz/Weiss 1983) . Firing can also be explained by the firm's (asymmetric) information about the worker's performance. Annual evaluation scores, which may be included in Z, measure relative performance, and low-scoring workers have a higher chance of being fired. In its layoff decision at the end of the initial episode the firm incorporates the quit behavior of the workers that it observed during the episode. Firing decisions also depend on statutory replacement costs that vary among workers. Given a worker's productivity, this variation is in large part due to differences in tenure at the time of firing.
An announcement of workforce reorganization changes the contingent contract between the worker and the firm. This may discourage some workers, who interpret the announcement as a departure from the informal agreement with the employer. The firm sees workers stay who are observationally identical to those who quit and realizes that these workers have, ceteris paribus, a high reservation wage «/, or a low £,i. The firm can either react non-cooperatively or cooperatively. On the one hand, it can interpret a worker's low e,i as too high a reservation wage. In that case, the non-cooperative firm will match it with a high v,i, so that corr(v,i,£,i) = p F x < 0. On the other hand, the cooperative firm can observe en to learn about a worker's loyalty to the firm when things turn bad. A high reservation wage -a low £,i -signals loyalty to the firm. Especially in times of economic distress, disloyal workers can be extremely harmful to the firm. In a model of monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal agent relationship, Radner (1981) showed that the principal (the firm) observes the agent's (the worker's) disloyalty by means of a "statistical method of detecting 'cheating' by the agent rapidly enough to deter him from doing so" (1981: 1128). Radner does not say what that method is. We propose a method for detecting idiosyncratic disloyalty based on each worker's observed reservation wage. If the firm's objective is to identify and retain the most loyal workers, it will couple a low e,i with a low v,i, so that p\ > 0. In accordance with Radner's results, disloyalty is especially harmful to a firm that faces a high bankruptcy risk. Even though one might rationalize either sign for this correlation, a positive correlation should become more likely as the firm's chance of demise increases. F*j is revealed in part to worker i when she sees other workers being fired. F/i = 1 if F"n > 0, for Nf workers. Others are allowed to stay with the firm until the beginning of Episode 2, so that F,i = 0 if F*j < 0 for Ni = Nf -N[ workers. The probability individual i is fired at the end of Episode 1 conditional on not having quit during Episode 1 is
where is a vector of unknown parameters, and A® = ^[QSj/af )Xn]/(l -0\fii/af)Xn]).
Subsequent episodes of downsizing
Initially the firm may have considered the negative shock to product demand to be a temporary blip. When new information becomes available with no sign of recovery, or additional negative shocks jeopardize the value of the firm, more downward adjustments may be necessary. The difference now is that the workers as well as the firm can use the experience of the previous episode optimally to recalculate the net present value of the match and act accordingly. If downsizing continues, two-sided learning should incorporate the information gathered about each other's expectations and intentions revealed during the previous episode.
Worker-initiated separations during subsequent downsizing episodes
The essential point, and the novelty of our analysis of turnover, is that the employer's behavior and prior patterns of mobility by the worker's fellow employees reveal information to her about her future earnings inside the firm. We assume that her wage inside the firm will be higher if her firm-specific skills are relatively scarce, since the employer will wish to induce her to remain in the firm in order to retain her services. A high rate of quits by workers similar to her during the previous episode t -1, Qu-i, signals this scarcity to her.
Obversely, she infers that her inside wage will be lower if the employer's demand for her skills has declined. A decline is signaled to her by the employer's recent layoff behavior, in particular by layoffs of workers like her at the end of Episode t -1, P,t_i. We can thus write the worker's propensity to quit as
where £,( is a worker-specific normally distributed residual with mean zero and variance (<rp) 2 , and T marks the firm's final reorganization episode that leads to its bankruptcy. In the absence of new shocks the effects of a worker's altered marginal productivity due to previous quits and layoffs imply that a>Qt = 9Q /9Q < 0 and a>® = dQ*/dF > 0. The arrival of new information on which workers base their quit decisions might indicate, for example, an unexpected continuation of deficient demand for the firm's product. This could reverse the signs of both derivatives. Observing WQ, > 0 then suggests that similar workers continue quitting as they did before, while cbft < 0 suggests that workers who were not fired earlier are now quitting. This behavior could suggestand hence identifies -a change in beliefs about the permanence of the decline in product demand.
The expectations that workers form about the likelihood of being fired at the end of this episode are based on a rational decision process that uses what occurred at the end of Episode t-1. The information used by the employer at the end of the current episode t that renders different from is unknown to the worker at the time of the quit decision during Episode t and is thus uncorrelated with Q*r There are two ways the worker can interpret the observed D"_I and act on that interpretation. On the one hand, low signals that, compared to observationally equivalent colleagues, she was unlikely to be fired during the last episode. As a consequence workers like her have become scarce to the firm. This would raise her reservation wage, w\, and lower e,(, so that corr((vt-\,Ejt) = pf > 0. On the other hand, she might also think, "I escaped unexpectedly last time, but I did not quit, so I may be on the chopping block this time." This could lead her to reduce her reservation wage and raise £", so that /?p < 0. In this case too one might rationalize either sign for the correlation. Unlike the declining firm's decisionmaking process, for workers we cannot predict its direction and how it may evolve as the firm approaches its demise. Given (5) the conditional probability that worker i quits during episode t is:
where
Employer-initiated separations at the ends of subsequent downsizing episodes Deriving the firm's firing policy proceeds essentially identically to the derivation of the workers' quit decisions in Episodes 2 to T. At the end of Episode t a worker's productivity is raised if recent quits and layoffs of similar workers have made his skills relatively scarce. A high rate of quits by similar workers during Episode t, Qu, and a high rate of comparable layoffs at the end of the previous episode, Fjt-I, signal this scarcity to the manager. The firm's firing decision then becomes Fj,=P '(Zit-,Qit-,Fa-f,vit) , »= l,...)Nf;f = 2,...,T,
where Vit is a worker-specific normally distributed error with mean zero and variance (erf) 2 . When no new shocks arrive, the effects of the altered value of available skills due to previous separations imply that a>Q t = 9F* /0Q < 0 and a>p t = 9F* /9F < 0. The arrival of new unexpected information about the firm's product demand can reverse the signs of both derivatives. Similar to the first episode, the firm observes the workers' quit behavior during the period, so that corr(eu, v") = p\. The probability that worker i is fired is
with AI = (y t /of)Z it + (¿^t/of)Qi t + (4X) Vi + (/WU,?-
The demise of Fokker aircraft
We apply his model using personnel data from Fokker, the world's oldest aircraft manufacturing company, which was founded in 1919 and based in the Netherlands. Between 1984 and 1996 the company developed and produced three types of aircraft. Figure 1 shows that the global market for these airplanes grew steadily until 1990, after which it plummeted for five years. In the beginning the firm attempted to overcome the negative demand shock by lengthening its production process; but when demand remained low it ran out of resources and went bankrupt. After 1995 global demand recovered (see Fig . , 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Years Table la, taken from the report of the bankruptcy trustees, gives an overview of the employment reductions and dismissals that were announced between 1991 and 1996. Five episodes can be distinguished, each marked by advance notification of workforce reductions. In the descriptive and econometric analyses here we consider only tenured workers ages 17 to 54 years for whom positive payroll amounts appear in the corporate records. Table 1 b shows the status of these workers distinguished by whether they quit, were laid off or remained with the firm. When the firm died at the end of Episode 5, approximately half of the remaining workforce was permanently displaced, while the other half was offered a one-year contract in a newly created, leaner, but eventually unsuccessful firm that the bankruptcy trustees launched.
The variables that we use in our analysis are ones commonly used in studies of worker turnover (e.g., Blau/Kahn 1981 , Topel/Ward 1992 , such as age, tenure, gender, educational level, educational type (general vs. vocational/technical), hours worked, and marital status. We also include information on the number of internal training courses provided by the firm to the worker, the number of external courses provided by other training agencies but commissioned by the firm, the outcomes of annual performance evaluations, and workers' commuting distances. To elucidate the process of worker turnover during the firm's final years we distinguish six different employee groups. Groups 1 to 4 consist of those workers who left the firmquits and layoffs -during the Episodes 1 to 4 respectively. The fifth group comprises workers who stayed until the firm's death and who on the Monday after the bankruptcy received an envelope with only the official dismissal notification. The sixth group consists of those workers who received two letters that day, one the dismissal letter from the bankrupt firm, and the other a one-year contract with the newly created company. One way to look at the turnover process in this dying firm is presented in Tables 2. Table 2a shows the means of selected variables at Episode 1 for all groups. Tables 2b-2e present the means of selected variables at Episodes 2 to 5 for all groups remaining in the firm. We summarize only the variables that differ or change across episodes or groups. Tables 2 provide an initial view of the potential biases to losses from displacement that arise from considering only those workers employed in the firm at its closure (Groups 5 and 6, in the left-most two columns). These workers are disproportionately male, married, technically educated, and have longer tenure, better job evaluations, more internal (intramural) training courses and fewer external (extramural) training courses. Very clearly, basing inferences about losses to displacement on those workers who leave when a plant closes leads to overestimates if one bases one's inferences on the wage-tenure profile. Clearly too, the workers who stay until the end seem to be of more value to the firm than to other firms.
Estimating the two-sided learning model of labor turnover
The novelty of our model is the introduction of past patterns of mobility, both workerand employer-induced separations, into the worker's choice of when to leave and the employer's choice of whom to layoff. The central economic question in this study is whether learning occurs -whether workers and their employer make their decisions about turnover based not only on the workers' objective characteristics, but also on inferences about the impact of recent patterns of mobility on future wages and (unobservable) productivity. In this Section we specify the formulation of measures of F, and Q,, estimate the model's parameters and examine their significance and how they change as the firm's demise approaches.
The covariates in the quit equations (X") and the layoff equations (Z, t ) have both common and specific components. The common components include indicators for seven age groups, for females, for three levels of educational attainment (with basic education as the reference group), for technical/vocational education, part-time work, and marital status, and continuous measures of years of firm tenure, number of internal training courses and number of external training courses. The specific component -the exclusion restriction -in the quit equation is a variable that measures commuting distance (in kilometers). It is hard to argue for inclusion of this variable in the layoff equation, but barring complete foresight by workers one would expect that distance to work would affect the quit decision.
The specific component in the layoff equation is the measure of job performance. The informational content of this variable is clearly asymmetric, so that its value lies in the firm's comparisons across workers. That information is available to the employer but not to the employee, so that it cannot affect quit decisions. Expanding beyond the formal model, in the empirical application we allow workers' educational attainment to affect their perceptions of the impact of past patterns of mobility on their prospects in the firm. By doing so we allow for the possibility that the assessments take place at different rates or for reasons that are not observed by the econometrician but that are correlated with educational attainment.
For each Episode t the parameters are only identifiable relative to the standard errors <xp and of in the probits. One way to treat this identification problem is by setting all the standard errors equal to 1. In our application, however, it is very likely that the errors are different for quits and layoffs and that the associated variances change over time. Assuming constancy of these variances would also severely restrict the estimates of the twosided learning model in Section 2. Hence we do not impose these identifying restrictions, Tables 3a and 3b .
Quit equations
The demographic differences in propensities to quit generally accord with what has been demonstrated in the prior literature. Workers with lower quit propensities are between 35 and 50 years old, have longer tenure, and (surprisingly) are less well educated (except in Episode 2). That they have also taken more internal courses is consistent with the observation that these courses may represent shared firm-specific investments that inhibit workers from leaving the firm. That they are workers who live closer to their jobs is consistent with the expectation that propinquity to the workplace can offset other incentives to quit when the firm's prospects worsen.
The coefficients of Qu-\, l an d i are generally insignificant, except for Episode 3, when the estimated is negative for all levels of education and significantly negative for two. That ffi < 0 indicates that workers with low expected conditional firing probabilities in the second episode were more likely to quit in the third episode. This suggests a change in their beliefs about the character of the decrease in product demand and the firm's future prospects as of the third episode. Also in Episode 3 the estimated correlation coefficient p, is significantly negative, suggesting that the unexpectedly low idiosyncratic firing probability in the second layoff round reduced workers' reservation wages during the third episode.
Layoff equations
The results in Table 3b show that workers with lower firing probabilities have longer job tenure, are males (in Episodes 2, 3, 4 and 5), have higher educational attainment, have technical/vocational schooling (Episodes 1, 2, 3 and 5), have taken more internal and external training courses (Episodes 1, 3 and 5), are married (Episodes 1, 2, 3 and 5) and have a higher job evaluation during all episodes. 3 The firm chooses to retain workers with whom it shares more firm-specific capital, whose demographic characteristics pay off in the labor market, and who have the best relative annual job evaluation scores, all else equal.
In the layoff equations most of the coefficients of Q (i , F it _\ and are significant in Episodes 2, 3 and 4. At the early stages of the reorganization, in Episodes 2 and 3, ¿>Q ( is positive and significant. Due to its prolonged economic distress the firm increased its propensity to lay off workers whose observably similar counterparts quit during the previous episode. The final reorganization before the bankruptcy (at the end of Episode 4) shows that d>Q t < 0, and the argument of scarcity applies. We also find a>p t > 0 in Episode 4, showing hysteresis in the firm's layoff policy between Episodes 3 and 4.
Learning over time
One way to draw inferences from Table 3 about the parties' learning processes through time is by examining how the coefficients change. The interpretation of these compar-isons is difficult, however, because of the identification problem that results from the non-constancy of the variances over time. One simple solution is to perform tests of the hypotheses that the correlation coefficients, weighted by the variances, are zero or constant over time for the respective quit and layoff equations. The test statistics for workers' learning in the quit equations are:
Employee learning : = -.028; x*(4) = 6.4, p = .169
Time constancy : * 2 (4) = 5.8, p = .218.
Our estimates thus imply that p F > 0-and = 0. The employer clearly learns, but that learning is not constant through time (either because of hysteresis in the learning process or because of varies through time as a result of temporal variation in the arrival rate of shocks to product demand). This result provides evidence that in a repeated cooperative game between a firm and its workers the employer learns about workers' loyalty to the firm.
Workers exhibit no evidence of learning. This result might indicate that some workers form rational expectations one way (pp < 0) and some the other way (pf > 0), and that their numbers are roughly equal. Alternatively, it might show that the workers simply fail to form expectations in any systematic way. We also find no evidence of changes through time in the workers' inability to learn. This result is consistent with the finding that there was no change in patterns of investment in firm-specific human capital among a random sample of American workers as displacement approached (Hamermesh 1987) .
If learning about loyalty in a cooperative game of downsizing between the firm and its workers is important, and learning is not constant through time, following Radner (1982) we expect that the learning will converge faster to an optimal rate as the date of demise approaches. If the employer's learning develops through time, a crucial question then is in what direction, if any, it develops. Do the coefficients that describe its layoff policy indicate that the firm is steadily learning more about employees' loyalty (learning as a stationary autoregressive process), learning less (learning as a non-stationary or trending process), or merely that learning varies randomly across periods (learning as an i.i.d. process)?
To investigate this question we look at possible time-dependence in the process that generates the parameters of the layoff equations describing the firm's turnover policy as a function of each worker's observable characteristics Z,(. The existence of a temporal pattern in yt can be interpreted as evidence that the firm incorporates what it has learned about its workers' loyalty through time. (The coefficients yt = yt/of belong to the variables Z/f in equations (3) and (7).) During each episode of downsizing the employer constructs layoff decisions under uncertainty, basing its turnover policy on Z,(. To test for an underlying dynamic mechanism that affects the entire set of relevant parameters yt similarly, we investigate if the firm's layoff policy reveals a "parameter-generating process" that can be described by the dynamic fixed-effect model
t = 1,..., 5 (the number of episodes), and j = 1,... ,19 (the length of the parameter vector Z,(). The stationarity condition for this model is \(px \ < 1, with S\ = 0 indicating the absence of a trend affecting the process exogenously.
We consider four possible descriptions of the dynamics of the firm's incorporating learning into its turnover policy:
ii: 0 < <px < 1 stationary smooth learning;
iii: -1 < <px < 0 stationary alternate learning;
iv: \(p\ | > 1 nonstationary learning.
The parameter estimates (based on first-differences from fixed-effects estimates) are = 0.67 (s.e. = 0.03), and 6\ = 0.07 (s.e. = 0.11). The time-trend term is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero. The estimate <px suggests a stationary smooth learning process: The magnitude of the autocorrelation of the process dies out essentially exponentially. In other words, the firm learns increasingly more about its workers' behavior through time, but the accretion of knowledge decreases exponentially, with a smaller <px indicating a more rapid decay. Stated differently, the more downsizing episodes the firm goes through, the closer its turnover decisions approach the optimal layoff policy under uncertainty that incorporates what it has learned over time about individual workers' loyalty. That learning is not constant is consistent with learning theory generally -initial accretions are large, with declining marginal changes as the knowledge basis accumulates.
Our results imply that, in the presence of fixed adjustment costs, it is optimal for the firm to spread the downsizing process across a number of consecutive episodes. This allows it to analyze its workers' quit behavior and learn about the remaining workers' loyalty to the firm. While lumpy mass layoffs occur frequently, our results indicate that a once-andfor-all reorganization early in the process of corporate demise is sub-optimal for the downsizing firm, for that prevents it from designing a firing policy that takes advantage of learning about its employees' quit behavior.
5
Measuring the losses to displacement accounting for prior two-sided selection A major focus of the literature on labor-market displacement has been on the losses that workers incur when the firm downsizes or closes. The goal of much of this literature has been to infer the magnitudes of these losses in order to structure policies to compensate displaced workers (e.g., Kiefer/Neumann 1979 , Hamermesh 1987 . Much of this re-search has assumed that the losses can be measured by the firm-specific human capital embodied in the displaced workers and destroyed when they are laid off (and even more clearly so if the plant closes). These losses have been proxied by the value, in terms of higher wages, generated by the workers' tenure with the employer at the time when displacement occurs.
The difficulty with this common approach should be apparent from the analysis thus far. Workers who remain to be displaced are not a random sample of those who were employed when the prospect of displacement first arose. One of the variables strongly affecting selection into quitting and layoff before the plant closed was the worker's tenure with the firm. Thus workers remaining until the plant's demise will have different (presumably greater) tenure when the firm's difficulties began than the average worker present then. Moreover, wage-tenure profiles calculated based on those more senior workers who remain until the plant's demise are also unlikely to characterize wage determination among all the workers who were in the plant ab initio. Losses of firm-specific human capital cannot be indexed based on the non-randomly selected workers who remain with the firm throughout its decline.
To examine this issue we estimate standard log-earnings equations at two points in time: 1) Episode 1, the first time that information became publicly available that Fokker was having severe difficulties; and 2) Episode 5, i.e., including only those workers who were present when bankruptcy was declared. Various characteristics observed at Episode 1 of all workers included in the first group, of those in the first group who were eventually fired before bankruptcy, and of workers in the second group, are presented in the first three columns of Table 4 . The workers who remained until bankruptcy were more senior than their fellow workers at Episode 1, had received higher job evaluations, and were more likely to be married and male and to have had a technical/vocational education.
The standard measure of the annual wage loss of the average worker displaced when a plant closes (in our case, at bankruptcy) calculates
Jo where T indexes firm tenure, f (•) is the density function describing the tenure of workers who are displaced at bankruptcy, and W (•) are wages at the time of bankruptcy as a function of tenure, conditional on other wage determinants. Recognizing that the structure of wages changes during the firm's decline, we can correct the errors in (10) by calculating an average loss based on the wage structure before it became contaminated by the non-random departure of workers and by the firm's adjustments to its wage policies. We substitute W°(T), the wage structure at Episode 1, for W*(T) in (10) to compute L°. Even this measure fails to account for non-randomness in the distribution f*(T), however. The best measure of the loss to all employees affected by the firm's decline substitutes into (10) both W°(T) and f°(T), the distribution of firm tenure at their departure of workers who were present when the decline began.
The upper panel of Table 5 shows the coefficients of the quadratic in tenure from logearnings equations calculated at Episode 1, and from the same regressions estimated at Episode 5 for those workers who remained until bankruptcy and who are thus the only workers who would be included in a conventional study of plant closings. Clearly, the apparent returns to tenure diminished as the firm approached its end, no doubt because the non-random selection of workers out of the firm during this time resulted in a less heterogeneous and substantially more senior workforce at the time of its demise. (The coefficient of variation of tenure was 0.95 at Episode 1, but only 0.55 at Episode 5.) This apparent decline in the returns to firm tenure means that previous estimates of lost firmspecific human capital understate the losses because they understate the returns to tenure in a healthy firm. The calculations of L* and L° shown in the bottom panel of Table 5 confirm this observation. In this sample the average annual earnings lost by those workers who remain until the end are somewhat (3.6 percentage points) higher when we base the measure on the structure of wages before it was influenced by the non-random departure of other workers during the firm's decline.
While L° accounts for the change in the structure of wages, it is still based on the distribution of tenure of only those workers who chose and whom the firm chose to remain until the end. To calculate the average loss to all workers affected by the firm's decline and eventual demise, the next calculation in Table 5 bases L* on what the tenure of the average worker who left the firm (voluntarily or involuntarily) would have gained him or her under the wage structure prevailing when the decline began. This measure of the annual earnings loss of workers whose employment relation was severed is remarkably close to the conventional measure. The flattening earnings-tenure profile as the firm nears its demise almost exactly offsets the impact of increasing average tenure among the remaining workers.
Finally, we showed in the previous section that voluntary quitting appears in this sample not to have reflected workers' learning (not to have been informed by the firm's declining prospects). That being the case, one might argue that there are no extraordinary losses to workers who quit, so that including them in the calculation of average tenure is mistaken. In Table 5 we thus present an alternative calculation of L* based on the tenure when they were fired of all those employees who were present at Episode 1 and who did not subsequently quit. The results suggest that this measure exceeds the conventional one, but again the differences are slight.
The appropriate measure for evaluating the loss faced by displaced workers must be uncontaminated by the effects of non-random selection on inferences about the average loss per worker. That being so, the best estimate of the wage that workers leaving Fokker would have received elsewhere is 19.9percent (1 -exp(-.222) ) below what they received at Fokker. This wage loss engendered by displacement is quite similar to the wage loss that we would infer was experienced by those workers who were directly affected at Fokker's eventual bankruptcy. Basing compensation on the experiences of those workers present at Fokker alone gives the correct per-worker calculation in this case simply because the wage-tenure profile changed so as to offset the firm's rising tenure profile.
The specific example in this calculation is not important. The issue is the more general one that conventional calculations of the losses to displaced workers are incorrect for two reasons: 1) The wage structure used to infer losses is estimated incorrectly because the workers included in the estimation are selected non-randomly; and 2) Non-random selection means that the characteristics of the group directly affected by a plant closing are not necessarily those of all workers who are affected by the entire process of a firm's death. Both kinds of selectivity need to be accounted for when constructing policies to compensate displaced workers.
Measuring employers' gains from learning
Estimates like those in Section 4 can also be used to infer how much a firm gains by learning about the productivity and market opportunities of its workers as it approaches shutdown. Viewed differently, we can use the estimates to calculate the gains from considering this additional set of determinants of firms' layoff behavior. In our specific example the interesting question is how much the company gained at Episode 5 from the learning that we inferred it did over the entire period. We are thus asking what the value of that learning was to the company, but only at the point of the bankruptcy. The gains are presumably in the increased value of the firm attributable to the firm-specific human capital that would otherwise have been lost had the firm not learned about its workers' productivity and opportunities.
To calculate the gains to learning that are realized when the firm reorganizes at bankruptcy we compare the layoff probits that include learning (those presented in Table 3b ) to a counterfactual layoff probit that excludes the learning measures (the interactions of the education indicators with lagged fires and quits) and the A®. Table 6 shows the results of various tests of the interaction terms and the A^ in Table 3b . While the individual interaction terms are mostly statistically insignificant, the two vectors of interaction terms are marginally significant as a group; and when the selectivity term is added the significance of our structural addition to simple models of turnover is further enhanced.
To calculate the gains to learning we ask how many workers are correctly predicted not to be fired in the enhanced probit in the final column of Table 3 b compared to the number correctly predicted in a simple counterfactual probit that excludes the possibility of learning. We then value this difference by valuing the firm's share of firm-specific human capital. We use the estimate in Table 5 of the lost earnings of those fired at Episode 5 (all those who would usually be counted as displaced in a plant closing) and assume that this is the value of returns to the retained workers' firm-specific human capital. On a perworker retained basis the calculation is 15.63 (9) .07 F it _i* interactions = 0, and A? = 0 a The model without learning is the simple probit that would have been estimated without using any prior knowledge about the history of workers in the firm and with Qi4=OFiJ.=Cu Q =o-where W is the average wage of workers at this point, s is the firm's share of the specific human capital in which it and its workers have invested, fLEARN and fNoLEARN are the fractions of workers retained after Episode 5 predicted correctly in the expanded and simple probits respectively.
Of the workers remaining just before Episode 5, 48.8 percent were retained. 25.8 percent of all workers were correctly predicted as being retained in the expanded probits that included learning. Only 23.7 percent of all workers were correctly predicted as retained in the probits that did not account for learning. Taking mean annual earnings per worker as 52,080 guilders, the calculation in (11) yields 1082 guilders per worker retained under the assumption that s = 0.5. The firm retained 2619 workers (Table lb) , which sums to an estimated value of learning of $ 1.6 million in 1996. Stated differently, the gain per retained worker is about 2.1 percent of the average worker's annual earnings. If the firm's share of the returns to firm-specific training exceeds 0.5, its monetary gains from learning about workers' behavior are still greater.
The result here is for Fokker alone; and it would be interesting to expand it to an entire economy. Based on the figure of $ 9.1 billion in labor costs among displaced manufacturing workers in the United States that we noted in Section I, our estimates here suggest that employers' learning might lead to an annual savings of $ 191 million on these workers (.021 x $ 9.1 billion). The cohort of firms that close each year reaps this gain, however, over the entire length of the process leading up to closing. In our example this process took six years, but we have no idea whether that is typical. Assuming it is, however, then for U.S. manufacturing the annual gain arising from employers' learning rises to $1.15 billion. Since this is for manufacturing alone, and since plant closings are more common among smaller firms, it is likely that the total annual value to employers of this type of learning as their businesses slide toward closing is still greater.
Conclusions
In this study we have proposed the simple idea that the parties to an employment relationship may learn about each other's intentions about ending the relationship by forming expectations based on the other party's prior behavior that ended similar relationships. Workers may observe how the employer's firing has varied with differences in voluntary mobility and may adjust their own mobility accordingly. Employers may observe which workers have quit in the past and adjust their firing behavior to reflect their altered expectations about individual workers' future mobility.
We have examined these possibilities using a unique data set describing the history of mobility in a large Dutch firm during its final six years of existence. The evidence suggests that workers' quitting is unaffected by expectations about the employer's layoff policies. The firm learns which employees are likely to quit, however, and alters its layoff policies accordingly. That learning, moreover, is quite rapid early in the process of the firm's decline but decreases as more information is accreted.
That learning occurs adds another reason why the workers who remain until a plant closes are selected non-randomly from the group of workers present when the firm's difficulties began. This non-randomness means that any attempt to measure workers' losses from a plant closing will be biased, as it is based on a selected sample of workers. To evaluate the extent of this bias we adjust standard measurements of losses resulting from displacement to account for this two-sided selection. While both of these adjustments are important, their opposite effects mean that in our particular example the bias is small.
We have presented a theory of learning and an econometric case history to illustrate it. The basic idea can be expanded upon in a variety of ways. First, within the context of our model the behavior of other declining firms could be studied -nothing guarantees that workers in all such firms fail to learn, nor that all employers learn in the way that the employer that we studied did. A second, more important avenue would note that, while our model is specific to a declining firm, a more general model could also encompass the learning process in growing firms by accounting for the role of learning about quits in determining the pattern of hiring and firing. (Avery specific, mundane example might be the behavior of university economics departments in hiring/tenure decisions about junior faculty in the face of a changing entry-level job market for economists.) The general point we have made -that studying prior interactions between learning by firms and workers is useful in analyzing mobility patterns -seems applicable to understanding the dynamics of all types of mobility.
